Turning to the criminal side of the judicial aisle, there is now a case likely on its way to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that could change the concept of privileged communications with the clergy forever.

Via Grits for Breakfast, we learn that the pro-prosecution First Court of Appeals in Houston has ruled that Rule 505 of the Texas Rules of Evidence doesn’t apply to confessions given by members of the Church of Christ. Why? Because the court found that the Church of Christ doesn’t have doctrine requiring that confessions be kept secret.

While the Church of Christ may be an odd duck when it comes to confessions (in particular because many confessions are repeated before the entire congregation), one must wonder why the First Court of Appeals is delving head-first into religious doctrine to find the answers to legal problems.

Although the Rule plainly states that, “A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional character as spiritual adviser,” the court has done an end-run around a sacrosanct legal principle and has, in short, left many other protestant denominations in limbo.

This is yet another reason we need more balance on the Court of Criminal Appeals. Who knows what will happen if the present CCA gets their hands on this decision. They may well decide that, doctrine or no doctrine, it’s time to do away with Rule 505 in its entirety.

Technorati Tags Church of Christ, Court of Criminal Appeals, First Court of Appeals, Houston, privileged communications, Rule 505, Texas Rules of Evidence, Texas Supreme Court

Abbott’s press release is downright laughable:

Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott defended the right of Texas schoolchildren to begin each school day with the Pledge of Allegiance followed by a minute of silence to “reflect, pray, [or] meditate” before class. In a brief filed Friday with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Attorney General Abbott argued that Texas’ moment of silence statute is entirely constitutional. In January, a federal district judge rejected a North Texas couple’s challenge to the law. Solicitor General James Ho will appear before the appeals court on behalf of the state.

It’s hardly defending a “right” when the moment of silence is mandated by state law. Too, I wonder what the Fifth Circuit will have to say about the fact that the Texas Education Agency didn’t send out a memo affirming the “secular purpose” of the law until after the Croft family filed its lawsuit.

You may recall that, although the trial court upheld the law’s constitutionality, there were significant concerns raised by the tardy memorandum.

Tags: Texas, Moment+Of+Silence

An unsuccessful school board candidate filed a federal lawsuit Monday alleging that the Irving school district’s system of at-large elections violates the law because it denies representation to Hispanics.

Manuel Benavidez, a Mexican-American who twice ran unsuccessfully for the Irving school board, is the named plaintiff in the suit, which was filed by attorneys for the Dallas firm Bickel & Brewer.

The named defendants are Irving ISD and its seven elected trustees.

Mr. Benavidez filed a similar suit in November against the Irving City Council’s at-large election system. He could not be reached for comment Monday.

The suit asks the federal court to find that the at-large system of elections violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965. They ask that the school district develop a new single-member district system of electing representatives from individual districts carved out within district boundaries.

No Hispanics serve as school trustees in Irving ISD, whose officials estimate that 67 percent of students are Hispanic. About 42 percent of the city’s residents are Hispanic, according to 2006 Census Bureau reports.

“The voting system puts the election of all school board members in the hands of the white majority,” attorney Bill Brewer said. “It doesn’t give ways for the significant Hispanic majority to have a fair opportunity for representation.”

In 2000, voters elected Ruben Franco the school district’s first and only Hispanic trustee. He served two three-year terms.

The school board was all white until this spring, when voters elected two African-American trustees, Nancy Jones and A.D. Jenkins. Two Hispanics ran against them, Stacey Ponce and Jorge Chac II. Ms. Ponce received about 17 percent of the vote and Mr. Chac, 18 percent.

The fact is that the victory belonged to Democrats–and Texas voters–not the Texas Attorney General. That’s actually something pretty easy to figure out. Why? Because the AG’s office was the one proffering the settlement agreement. The Attorney General of Texas typically does not offer forth settlements in which they give the farm away (or come close) if they think they have a winnable case. Clearly, the AG’s office didn’t think they could win a trial in which an elderly activist would have testified that AG-men were peeping at her in the shower.

Via our friends at the Lone Star Project, here are the nuts and bolts of the settlement agreement (followed, of course, by our analysis):

The Texas Attorney General has agreed to rewrite prosecution guidelines to reflect that voters who merely possess the ballot of another voter with that voter’s consent will not be investigated or prosecuted unless there’s evidence of actual fraud. Prosecutions will be limited to cases exists such as when a person illegally votes a ballot for another person or causes a person to vote for a different candidate than they wish.

That’s more like it. That the AG’s office has consented to rewrite its internal prosecution guidelines is something quite significant. It’s far from a victory for the AG. Basically, this will stop the AG from prosecuting people who are volunteers in possession of mail-in ballots that have been given to them by the actual voters to mail.

Also, as the LSP noted:

By agreeing to this settlement, the Texas Attorney General has essentially acknowledged that those who have been prosecuted to date for hypertechnical violations of failing to sign a mail ballot envelope did not commit any fraud, as he has falsely claimed for years.

Another concession by the state:

The Attorney General also agreed that the Secretary of State would change instructions to voters who vote by mail in 2008. The Secretary of State had already made changes to the ballot envelope and instructions to voters, acknowledging that such changes were made as a result of the lawsuit. The Attorney General and Secretary of State also agreed to consider additional revisions to voter instruction language that make it clear to voters, and those who assist them, the proper procedures for voting by mail. The Plaintiff will also help the Secretary of State’s office create training materials and guidelines so those who help their neighbors vote will do so in accordance with the law.

Again, a clear change in language and policy that makes things better. And more:

Plaintiffs agreed to drop all pending claims except for the pending challenge to the State’s restriction on a person’s acting as a witness on only one mail ballot application.

The “one mail ballot” rule is simply stupid, so that challenge must continue.

Here is what Texas Democratic Party Chair Boyd Ritchie had to say on the matter:

“Today’s settlement of the federal Voter Suppression case is a significant win for Texas Democrats and all Texans who cherish the right to cast a vote free from intimidation. The settlement should put an end to Attorney General Greg Abbott’s use of taxpayer dollars to selectively prosecute Democrats who were ‘guilty’ of nothing more than helping a friend or neighbor who is elderly or disabled get their perfectly legal ballot to the mailbox.”

Of course, AG Greg Abbott preens even in defeat:

The plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge Rep. Wolens’ 2003 Texas Election Code amendments hinged on their claim that the law was intended to suppress certain voting groups. To the contrary, public comments by former Rep. Wolens, his “purpose was to eliminate fraud in absentee balloting.” According to the former state representative, both he and his wife, the former mayor of Dallas, were victims of “rigged elections with people harvesting votes.” Vote harvesting is a term typically associated with those who illegally stockpile mail-in ballots—which may belong to either actual voters or non-existent voters created by election fraud perpetrators—and therefore undermine the electoral process by casting multiple votes.

Today’s dismissal concludes the plaintiffs’ year and a half long effort to stop the Attorney General from enforcing Election Code provisions that prevent fraud and coercion during the mail-in ballot process. The plaintiffs’ filed their lawsuit in September, 2006. In the days leading to the November 2006 election, the plaintiffs asked a federal district court to temporarily restrain the State from enforcing challenged Election Code provisions.

An earlier district court decision favoring the plaintiffs was stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which ruled that the State could continue enforcing election fraud prevention laws. The State scored a second victory when the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the plaintiffs’ appeal. Last January, Texas scored another victory when the Fifth Circuit once again issued a decision favoring the State, vacating an early injunction issued by the trial court.

After conducting months of pre-litigation maneuvering and discovery, during which the State produced thousands of documents, the plaintiffs offered to drop their lawsuit. Just days before the trial was scheduled to begin, the plaintiffs approached the State about resolving the dispute by dismissing their lawsuit against the Attorney General and working to improve voters’ access to information about State election laws. Before the court finalized today’s dismissal, the State read a mutually agreed-upon statement into the court record. That statement reiterated pre-existing policies and procedures that provide guidance to investigators with the Office of the Attorney General who investigate Election Code violations.

Although today’s dismissal concludes the plaintiffs’ attempt to prevent the Attorney General’s election fraud enforcement efforts, a facial challenge to Section 84.004 of the Election Code still remains before the court. That provision generally limits the number of early voting applications that a single individual can witness during an election cycle.

The problem here is that the AG wasn’t prosecuting “vote harvesters.” They were prosecuting elderly, female, African American Democrats who were doing no such thing. If they wanted to prosecute vote harvesters, then they should look in the phone book for “Adult Daycare” in Edinburg, Texas. (At least, that’s what we hear).

After a review of the opinion issued by Judge Walter Smith (of Branch Davidian siege case fame, for those judicial trivia buffs out there), it appears that both Dingus and the Republican Party of Texas are right–partially–in their interpretations of what the court has ordered. The ruling is hardly a “complete victory” for the Republican Party of Texas–and it hardly declares that Dingus may stay on the ballot.

From the opinion:

Mr. Dingus’ eligibility defect is a substantive defect based on the Texas Constitution’s eligibility requirements. The Francis case limited its holding to only facial defects, which are not present in this case. 186 S.W.3d at 542-43. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not present any legally cognizable claims for relief.

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of the Republican Party of Texas and Tina Benkiser, in her capacity as Chair of the Republican Party of Texas is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ claims against the Republican Party of Texas and Tina Benkiser, in her capacity as Chair of the Republican Party of Texas, are DISMISSED. It is further ORDERED that any and all pending motions or requests not previously ruled upon by the Court are DENIED as moot.

Here is the statement Capitol Annex received from TDP Communications Director Hector Nieto a while ago:

The Texas Democratic Party has received the judge’s opinion. Our attorney is currently in the process of reviewing the opinion and determining what steps, if any, the Texas Democratic Party will take.

Here is the statement from the Republican Party of Texas:

“The Court’s ruling is a complete victory for the Republican Party of Texas. The Court not only held that the Democratic Party candidate for the Texas House of Representatives in District 82 is not eligible for the Legislature because he already holds a lucrative office as a member of the Midland City Council, but also held that the eligibility defect of the Democratic Party candidate cannot be cured by him now resigning his City Council office. Needless to say, we are very pleased with the decision. We now hope appropriate action will be taken by the relevant individuals and entities,” said Tina Benkiser, Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas.

Earlier, of course, there was some confusion as to what the order actually meant. QR was reporting that Dingus maintained he was still on the ballot:

“Contrary to early news reports, I remain on the ballot for State Representative. Judge Smith did not remove me from the ballot. He only dismissed the Texas Democratic Party’s complaint.”

In order to explain all of this and the confusion it has caused, some background is necessary here.

The TDP actually brought this suit against the Republican Party of Texas. At issue here is whether another federal court’s order stands above the provisions of the Texas Constitution that mandate “resign to run” in cases like this, which in and of itself was specific to the Midland City Council. The TDP contended that, based on the court order, Dingus did not need to resign from his city council position:

Plaintiffs’ claim is based on a 1996 federal court order (the “Order”) in a voting rights case that allowed existing city officers to maintain their current city council positions while running for another office. The Order states in relevant part:

If the Mayor or any Council Member shall announce their candidacy, or shall in fact become a candidate, in any general, special or primary election, for any office of profit or trust under the laws of the State of Texas or the United States other than the office then held, such announcement or candidacy shall not constitute an automatic resignation of the office then held and such resignation shall occur only when the individual is sworn in to serve the new office.

If that isn’t just as clear as mud to you, consider that the R’s further muddied the water by alleging that this order was issued during a time the city of Midland was transitioning from at-large to single-member districts, which isn’t something that particularly seems to matter.

Because, when Dingus filed for office, he relied on that court order, the TDP sued asking for a declaratory judgment declaring:

(1) Mr. Dingus is eligible to run for and serve in the office he seeks;
(2) acceptance and certification of Mr. Dingus’ ballot application was proper by
Plaintiffs; and
(3) Mr. Dingus is eligible to seek the Office of State Representative, District 82.

Additionally, the TDP had an alternate relief request: that if the Court vacated or clarified its order and declared Dingus ineligible for the office, that Dingus be granted the opportunity to resign after the fact. Or, in the alternative, that if Dingus resigned, that injunctive relief be granted to provide that his name be on the ballot.

Boiling all of this down to brass tacks, the TDP basically contended that the previous federal court order Dingus followed was in full force. The Republicans countered that the order had a limited scope to a finite time period, and was not intended to govern or usurp the Texas Constitution for all future election cycles.

Essentially, the judge agreed with the Republicans’ arguments–that the previous order simply did not apply to Dingus.

What the judge actually ordered was the dismissal of the lawsuit. Although the judge stated in his opinion that Dingus was ineligible to be on the ballot, it is in no way clear that his order actually takes Dingus off the ballot. In fact, the Court addresses–in several points–that neither the Texas Democratic Party nor the Texas Secretary of State has declared Dingus ineligible for office, and points out that only specific parties have standing when challenging ballot eligibility.

Interestingly, the court also holds that the Dingus problem of not resigning is not a facial defect such as Judge Robert Francis had with his petitions for office back during the 2006 election cycle (In Re Francis).

Although the judge’s opinion did state that Dingus was not eligible for the ballot, the main crux of the opinion was that the previous order involving the Midland City Council simply was no longer valid and did not declare the Texas Constitution unconstitutional.

The Order does not hold that resignation is not required when it is required under Texas election law. Further, Judge Bunton did not declare the Texas Constitution unconstitutional regarding candidacy requirements. The Court agrees that a person holding a lucrative office, such as a member of the Midland City Council, is not eligible to become a candidate for the Texas Legislature.

The big, big, big issue here, and the one upon which Republicans are claiming victory, is whether this opinion keeps Dingus off the ballot or actually declares him ineligible. I would argue that it does not. It simply dismisses the TDP’s complaint, but does so in language that makes it clear that, when the time comes to actually determine Dingus’ eligibility, he simply is not eligible.

Pete Palmer, a sophomore at Waxahachie High School, wants the right to wear the shirt at school. The suit, filed by the Liberty Legal Institute, also seeks unspecified monetary damages from Waxahachie Independent School District, according to the TV station.

The district violated Palmer’s constitutional right to free speech by kicking him out of school for wearing the shirt, according to the institute.

But according to the Waxahachie Independent School District dress code, students can’t wear shirts with political slogans.

“T-shirts, other than WISD clubs, organizations, sports, or spirit t-shirts, college or university t-shirts or solid-colored t-shirts, are prohibited,” according to the policy.

School officials cite the dress code policy and disagree that it is an attempt to stifle free speech.

“It has nothing to do with trying to stifle anyone’s free speech,” Thomas J. Collins, Waxahachie Independent School District superintendent, told MyFOXDFW.com.

I am a little surprised that the Liberty Legal Institute is involved in this; I thought they were a right-wing group. Either way, I’m glad to see what WISD will have to answer for this in court.

If you’ll recall, Capitol Annex told you we expected serious constitutional challenges to this law during the session.

From the DMN:

Lawyers for Texas’ adult entertainment industry are asking a judge to block a state-mandated $5 cover charge at strip clubs – money that, starting Jan. 1, will be collected to fund sexual assault prevention and health care for the uninsured.

The suit, filed Wednesday in Travis County, alleges that lawmakers violated club operators’ constitutional right to free speech when they approved the surcharge last spring. Owners of topless bars have argued that the fee, designed to help victims of sexual assault, imposes a discriminatory tax on their businesses and unfairly links their patrons to rape.

And though officials from the Texas attorney general’s office vowed to do whatever it takes to uphold the adult entertainment fee, government insiders acknowledged quietly that they may face an uphill battle.

There is no doubt that this fee would serve a noble purpose. And, I think it’s a good thing for the state to try to do. But, I do see the constitutional argument here and simply don’t think this will hold up in court, and I expect it to go all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

On another note, I’m not familiar with the “adult entertainment industry” in Texas (though I assume they have, uh…let’s call them “lap dance lobbyists”), but I’d suspect it brings a good deal of money into the economy (which in and of itself is a frightening thought). I suspect, also, that part of the real reason the strip club owners are opposing this fee is because it means more licensing and more regulation for an industry which, I suspect, makes most of its profits “off book.” Unless there is a reader of Capitol Annex who happens to be an exotic dancer and can confirm that these employers send out W-2s, I suspect we’re right. Obviously, if strip clubs start reporting the $5 cover, but hide some of their other income, it will cause the folks who calculate franchise tax and all that good stuff to take a closer look at clubs that, for example, report $100,000 in $5 covers by a loss for the year.

The long and short of the filing is this: Houston homebuilder Bob Perry–who was a dangerous commodity in Texas in 2006–gave a million dollars to the Republican Governor’s Association. Shortly thereafter, on October 26 and November 1, the governor’s association cut Rick Perry two half a million dollar checks for his campaign. In other words, to conceal his money and influence over the governor, Bob Perry funneled his money to the Governor’s Association who, in turn, did a back-hand slide to Governor Perry.

Also, the suit (full version below the fold), alleges the Republican Governor’s Association PAC wasn’t properly registered in Texas.

Of course, Perry’s people are trying to spin this by saying it is sour grapes because Bell didn’t get a state lobby contract. The reality of the timing, however, is that the statute of limitations from Bell’s first knowledge of the situation was simply running out, thus the lawsuit being filed when it was.

Tags: Rick+Perry, Chris+Bell, Republican+Governor\'s+Association

Technorati Tags Chris Bell, Republican Governor's Association, Rick Perry

Two prosecutors in Texas, the nation’s leader in executions, said Wednesday they will wait for a Supreme Court decision on lethal injection procedures before asking judges to set execution dates for death row inmates.

Roe Wilson, who handles death penalty appeals for the Harris County District Attorney’s Office in the Houston area, said she also plans to ask a judge to withdraw the Feb. 26 execution date for a man convicted of killing a woman and her 2-year-old son.

Bell County District Attorney Henry Garza said he asked a judge to cancel a Jan. 24 execution for the same reason. “It just seemed to me that the writing was very apparent,” Garza said. “Now we’ll let them rule and we can come back in and act accordingly.”

In Texas, dates for executions are set by trial judges, typically at the request of local prosecutors. Twenty-six of the nation’s 42 executions this year have taken place in Texas. No other state has had more than three.

I wonder how many other counties will follow suit?

Today, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), expanded its lawsuit challenging the exclusion of certain military veterans from the Texas Hazlewood Act, which provides a waiver of tuition and fees at Texas public colleges and universities. MALDEF represents veterans who have been denied the waiver and attended the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Houston, North Harris College, as well veterans seeking to attend the University of Texas at San Antonio and West Texas A&M University. In the expanded lawsuit, MALDEF represents six veterans and the American GI Forum of Texas.

Although each plaintiff honorably completed his military service and is otherwise qualified, the State and its institutions have denied the veterans tuition waivers solely because they were not U.S. citizens when they first entered the service—even those veterans who have since become U.S. citizens. All the plaintiff veterans joined the military while they were legal permanent resident immigrants of the United States.

“It is shocking that veterans who served our country in times of war are excluded from this educational program across our State, from smaller community colleges to larger universities,” stated David Hinojosa, MALDEF Staff Attorney and lead counsel in this case. “Equally shocking is that the State and its institutions have not reversed course, even after the filing of this lawsuit.”

The lawsuit maintains that denying veterans who entered the military as legal permanent residents violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and other federal laws.

To fully illustrate just how asinine this is, all you have to do is read the first paragraph of the Court’s opinion, drafted by none other than Justice Nathan Hecht:

The State of Texas requires a private post-secondary school to meet prescribed standards before it may call itself a “seminary” or use words like “degree”, “associate”, “bachelor”, “master”, and “doctor” — or their equivalents — to recognize attainment in religious education and training. We must decide whether this requirement impermissibly intrudes upon religious freedom protected by the United States and Texas Constitutions. We hold it does and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Essentially, unaccredited religious institutions can now call themselves whatever they want and offer whatever kind of degrees they can invent. Does anyone else see the potential for fraud and misrepresentation this will cause?

Here’s a little background:

The court said banning an institution like the Tyndale Theological Seminary in Fort Worth from using the term “seminary” in its name violates the Constitution.

Three religious organizations waged the legal fight. Tyndale, one of the schools, was cited in 1998 for violating a law that requires seminaries to be accredited and prevents unaccredited institutions from awarding degrees. It was fined $173,000 by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.

Plano-based Liberty Legal Institute represented the schools and argued before the court in 2005 that the state has no business regulating how pastors are trained.

State law requires institutions to meet certain standards if they call themselves a college, university or seminary. The court ruled that the law as it pertains to seminaries intrudes upon religious freedom.

“This decision is a huge victory for all seminaries not only in Texas but nationwide,” said Kelly Shackelford, the institute chief counsel. “Seminaries are going to now be free to be seminaries … The shackles are off.”

The case is not about secular teaching and degrees, but about purely theological education, he said. Shackelford said the ruling means the plaintiffs can try to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in the case.

The Texas Attorney General’s Office represented the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and told the court that the state law aims not to regulate religion but only the quality of post-secondary education in Texas.

That’s true; it’s [Chapter 61 of the Education Code] kind of like the Deceptive Trade Practices Act for private education. For one thing, it has helped prevent “diploma mills” from operating. And, though the Court acknowledged this in their opinion, they still came to the same conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that section 61.304’s restriction on the words that a religious institution may use to refer to completion of religious programs of study is so broad that it violates the Free Exercise guarantees of the First Amendment and the Texas Constitution. The State may not deny a religious program of study clearly denominated as such the use of all words capable of describing educational achievement.

You can bet that if a Wicca school was converging degree titles of “High Priestess” upon people, the Court would have ruled differently.

This is yet another example of why we need change on the Texas Supreme Court.

Tags: Nathan+Hecht, Susan+Criss

Mr. Cook argued that the U.S. pledge has been allowed to stand mostly because it is a tradition and has been in place for decades. The Texas language is different because it is new, he said.

Mr. Cruz said this argument of “old may be OK, but new is bad” does not work because the language is identical and has never harmed children who said the U.S. pledge.

Cook’s argument, however, has some merit. Especially when you consider that the bill analysis for HB 1034 actually specified in writing that the purpose of the addition was not patriotic but rather to “acknowledge “our Judeo-Christian heritage.” From the floor debate between Rep. Lon Burnam (D-Fort Worth) and Debbie Riddle (R-Tomball), the bill’s author:

REPRESENTATIVE BURNAM: You know it’s a bill that doesn’t have very many words in it, Ms. Riddle.

REPRESENTATIVE RIDDLE: I’m sorry, I couldn’t hear you.
BURNAM: It is a bill that doesn’t have many words in it.

RIDDLE: It has three words.

BURNAM: But it is as fundamental as when the pilgrims stepped on the rock at the founding of this nation and I have a lot of questions that I need answered. Do you know that in the bill analysis it’s stated that your bill will acknowledge “our Judeo-Christian heritage”?

RIDDLE:Yes, sir.

BURNAM: I’m sorry?

RIDDLE:Yes.

During the Burnam/Riddle exchange, Burnam also asked Riddle about the doctrine of stare decisis. Given all of the uproar in the Legislature at the time, it didn’t register with me how important that was or why he was asking. Here’s some clips from that exchange:

BURNAM: Are you aware of the term stare decisis?
RIDDLE: I’m sorry.

BURNAM: Let me spell it. It s-t-a-r-e…

RIDDLE: I’m sorry, it’s echoing in here.Was I aware of what?

BURNAM: It’s the term.Were you aware of the term s-t-a-r-e d-e-c-i-s-i-s?

RIDDLE: No.

BURNAM: Alright, I’ll admit, the heckler in the background is pointing out that none of you are lawyers and I’m not a lawyer, so I can’t pronounce it well, and you don’t know what it is, so I’ll tell you. It means that the Supreme Court does not overturn precedent lightly, Ms. Riddle. Do you know, Ms. Riddle, that the Supreme Court disagrees with both our governor and with you.
RIDDLE: Are you trying to say precedence?

BURNAM: No, would you like for me to spell the word again?

RIDDLE: I was just trying to decipher what you were saying. I’m sorry.

BURNAM: Let’s just move on. Do you know, Ms. Riddle, that the Supreme Court disagrees with our governor and with you. Freedom of religion does not mean freedom from religion. That’s what you said and that’s what our governor has said.

Is that correct? Would you like for me to repeat the question? Do you know Ms. Riddle, that the Supreme Court disagrees with our governor and with you. The Supreme Court says freedom of religion does mean freedom from religion?

RIDDLE: That is your opinion, sir.

BURNAM: Justice Stevens writing for the majority in Wallace vs. Jaffree wrote, “the individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority,” the majority you referred to earlier. Moreover, the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. Were you aware of that?
RIDDLE: Sir, I believe that you are extremely articulate, you’re extraordinarily bright, and well-respected.

BURNAM: That’s just one example.

RIDDLE: You’re giving a great deal of information, but what I am telling you is every day, when we stand here on the floor of the house, we do say our national pledge.We continue to say “one nation under God” and this bill is simply to mirror or reflect “one state under God.”

BURNAM: Ms. Riddle, are you aware that simultaneous decisions by the Supreme Court allowed us to keep the ten commandments on the capitol lawn, but forced a Kentucky courthouse to remove the ten commandments?

RIDDLE: Do you see the inscription above me here, sir?

BURNAM: Ms. Riddle, could you answer my questions? I’m at the back mic.

RIDDLE: And what is your question?

BURNAM: The question is are you aware that simultaneous decisions by the Supreme Court allowed us to keep the ten commandments on the capitol lawn, but forced a Kentucky courthouse to remove the ten commandments?

RIDDLE: This is not about the ten commandments, sir. This is about the pledge.

BURNAM: Are you aware that Justice Breyer writing for the majority in the Kentucky case wrote the following, “When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates the simple establishment clause value of official religious neutrality, a purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence to religion generally, clashes with the understanding that liberty and social stability demand a tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens.”
[emphasis added]

On stare decisis now:

Stare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent; the term is but an abbreviation of stare decisis et non quieta movere — “to stand by and adhere to decisions and not disturb what is settled.”

When this case gets to the U.S. Supreme Court (provided the right-wingers up there maintain some semblance of justice), it’s likely that the pledge law will be struck down. The precedents existing apply to longstanding things, things that were already settled long ago. However, based on the Breyer quote from above, since the state acted, “with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion,” I don’t see how the pledge law can stand.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State has filed a lawsuit against a Texas public school district that sponsors prayer at high school graduation ceremonies.

Representing six parents and a former student, Americans United told the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas yesterday that the Round Rock Independent School District’s policy of allowing students to vote on whether to include prayer in its graduation ceremonies violates the First Amendment principle of church-state separation.

“Graduation ceremonies should welcome all students, regardless of their beliefs about religion,” said the Rev. Barry W. Lynn, executive director of Americans United. “Religion is personal, and decisions about it should never be the subject of a ‘majority rules’ vote.”

The school district policy allows a yearly vote by seniors on whether to include prayer in graduation ceremonies. In 2007, three of the district’s four high schools decided in favor of prayer. Americans United charges in its lawsuit that school officials organize, oversee and attempt to manipulate the votes on whether to include prayer at the ceremonies.

For example, earlier this year, officials at the district’s four high schools conducted the votes on whether to include prayer at the 2007 graduation ceremonies. The senior class at Westwood High School was the only class to vote against prayer, and it was promptly ordered by district officials to conduct a re-vote. Westwood seniors, however, again voted against prayer at their graduation ceremonies.

“There could be no mistake among the students that the vote was an official school-sponsored event: school officials crafted the ballot and orchestrated and carried out ballot delivery, collection, and tabulation,” Americans United argues in its Does v. Round Rock Independent School District lawsuit. “And there could be no mistake among the students about which way the District expected them to vote: the one senior class that voted to reject the invocation was promptly ordered to re-vote on the issue.”

Although the seniors at Westwood High School withstood the district’s pressure, prayer was included in the graduation ceremonies at McNeil, Stony Point and Round Rock high schools.

Before filing the lawsuit, Americans United in May asked district officials to remove prayer from the high schools’ graduation ceremonies. Round Rock Independent School District Superintendent Jesus Chavez, however, defended the prayer policy.

Americans United’s lawsuit asks the federal district court to declare that the school district’s prayer policy violates the First Amendment and to issue an injunction barring prayer at future graduation ceremonies.

The plaintiffs in the case have chosen to remain anonymous because they are concerned about hostile reactions to the lawsuit.

You can bet, after RVAA is fully implemented, we’ll be seeing a whole lot more of this.